A fundamental question in the philosophy of language is the dispute over whether the meaning of words is determinant. For example, should an amphibious plane be treated as a boat or an airplane for tax purposes. If one believes in linguistic determinacy, then through analysis of the concept of a boat, and analysis of the concept of a plane, every honest person will agree on an answer to the question. In the alternative, if the concept of a boat and the concept of a plane are indeterminant, fundamentally vague, then the only way to answer the question is to make an arbitrary decision. One decides to tax the amphibious plane as a boat, or as an airplane. A decision is simply made, which cannot be justified on principle, because the decision in fact determines what the principle means. If we decide to tax the property as a boat, then we have, partially, defined what it means to be a boat by virtue of our decision. In other words, our actions, our decisions, define what our words ultimately mean, our words do not define what our actions or our decisions ought to be. (The distinction between ought and is can only arise where there is a deviation between our actions and the customary actions of others.)
Note that although a decision is ultimately arbitrary, it is not capricious. That is to say, the decision is reached without a supporting principle or justification, but the decision has consequences. If the question is before a tax court, then there is obviously a difference between the rate at which planes and boats are taxed. It is on the basis of the indeterminacy of language that the friends/enemies distinction arises. Political powers decide questions of meaning, and those decisions have consequences to groups and individuals within the polity. Those who benefit from the decision of the sovereign are friends of the sovereign, while those who suffer are the enemies of the State.
In any judicial decision, two parties come equal before the law, but when the merits of the dispute are weighed, they exit the dispute as unequal, one side victorious, the other vanquished. That is to say, each judicial decision creates a hierarchy between the positions of the contesting parties. The parties who frequently win may be said to the friends of the state, and those who frequently lose may be viewed as enemies. We can also look at this type of process in the drafting and enacting of statutory laws. Each law has winners and losers, friends and enemies of the decision-makers.
I view the indeterminacy of language as the fundamentally correct description, and so I must agree with Carl Schmitt that the friends/enemy distinction--which characterizes politics--is the fundamentally correct one. Furthermore, it is clear that the only force which gives language determinacy is convention, custom and tradition, and that power to constrain the political exists only the extent that convention, custom and tradition is viewed as normative, rather than some form of structural oppression to overcome. That is to say, whether our attitude is one of friends with custom, or enemies of custom. To question existing customs is to expand the boundaries of politics. Obviously, a hostility to all customs results in a total politicizing of all aspects of life, as expressed in the divesting of meaning from language, Newspeak in the Orwellian State. Meaning is not derived from custom and tradition, but defined solely by the raw exercise of power. Big Brother defines what language means, and a citizen's role is to obey or to resist. What begins as a promise of liberation ends in total slavery. In my heart of hearts, I should want to say that anyone who understands this point cannot avoid a certain attitude of conservatism. But at the same time, I am providing a template for how a totalitarian order is constructed, which may offer a certain seduction for future would-be tyrants.
For language to have a determinant meaning, there must be a shared set of customs and a shared sense of reverence for existing customs. This does not prevent us from placing a general label on our system of customs, perhaps "ordered liberty" or "despotism", but it does entail that the meaning of our general label derives its meaning from our customs, our forms of life, and not vice versa. As a result, although the blog deals with political concepts and political philosophy, it does not concern itself with defining "negative liberty" or "positive liberty" or determining which is more important in some hypothetical thought experiment. If we are going to speak of liberty, then that concept can only be understood based on its historical genealogy, and if we take the extra-step of ruling in favor of one conception of liberty over another, then it is clear that we are no longer describing, but we are advocating, making a case for one way of looking at liberty. That is to say, we are noting our friendship with a certain conception of liberty, and our status as enemies of another conception of liberty. We are not determining, a priori, for all times and under all circumstances, how liberty MUST be understood.
Given our basic understanding of the meaning of concepts, and our genealogical/historical approach, the source of our contempt for contemporary analytic philosophy should be clear. Reason can never ultimately decide any political dispute, only our love or our enmity for one of the sides of the dispute can cause us to render a political judgment. We decide between two paths based on our guts, and only then do we concoct a rationale. Of course, we can claim universality for our side, that our views are rational, and that our enemies are irrational. But such a claim is not itself based on rational justification, but rather on a claim of supremacy of our judgments. We possess the superior intuitions in these matters, and our enemies inferiority is belied in their clinging to their irrational views.
Because the concepts of ordinary language are indeterminant, the so-called traditional problems of philosophy, as construed by analytical philosophy, are nonsense. There is no need to argue about the proper definition of "mind" is, what the concept "mind" means is revealed by its use. If there is a dispute between two groups about usage, the way the dispute can be resolved is by an authority--over the two groups--rendering an arbitrary decision. In the absence of an authority, the groups must out-compete one another in a civil way or stamp each other out through repression. It is clear that there can be no ultimate ground of language, nor any ultimate justification for any of our concepts, they simply are. If our concepts are to have any measure of truth at all, it is in the fact that they have endured across time and culture, and in this fact we can perceive their depth. What is good, what is true, endures. Our only objective can be to understand our own point-of-view, and those of other people with clarity, and to attempt to understand the logical consequences, if any, that arise from our positions.
This method can be contrasted with the method of rationalism, which derives its impetus from the method of geometry. One expounds certain axioms, and then one derives certain theorems from those axioms. Of course, even in geometry, there is no universal agreement on axioms, there is Euclidean geometry and non-Euclidean geometry. The issue is not whether Euclidean geometry is true, or non-Euclidean geometry is false, but rather what is the use to which the mathematical system is to be put. Of course, our modern rationalist, in the post-Euclidean age, draws no parallels between her method and the method of mathematics. The question cannot be whether or not God exists, or whether Gods existence can be proven, but rather does the concept of God have a meaning? Does the concept of God have a use in human forms of life? To the extent that a concept can be embodied, it may be said to exist. This is nothing more than the immense wisdom contained in the Christian doctrine of Incarnation.
If we take a concept like freedom, we could perhaps derive a proposed axiom about freedom, say something like "freedom is good". We could assemble another axiom, perhaps "equality is good". We could then debate whether freedom is better than equality, or vice versa, or attempt to say that the two concepts are really equivalent. From the perspective of linguistic indeterminacy, such reasoning is nonsense. Freedom, abstracted from an actual social order, is meaningless. Equality, abstracted from an actual social order, is meaningless. In contrast, my method is primarily anthropological, descriptive: this is how the world is. For me, there is a certain beauty in the harshness of the world, in the sense that it denies us, crushes us, thwarts us, and grinds us down into becoming something other than what we initially desired. We are forced to sleep outside on the cold ground, no longer dreaming about an ideal bed. We are forced to fit into the bounds of our container, until we too
resemble our vessel.
"Or hast Thou no need that aught contain Thee, who containest all things, since what Thou fillest Thou fillest by containing it? for the vessels which Thou fillest uphold thee not, since, though they were broken, Thou wert not poured out." --St. Augustine, Confessions
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