Wednesday, November 19, 2014

The Rise of Totalitarian States in Europe in the Early Twentieth Century



As I have discussed previously, the First World War was predicated on the rise of German power, both in terms of industrial capacity and wealth (constituting 40% of Europe as a whole in 1913) as well as population.  Germany, due to its strategic position of strength, made a bid for regional hegemony in Europe, culminating in the First World War.  I believe the strategic threat posed by Germany was critical to the Fall of the Tzar and the rise of Communism in Russia.

Industrially, Tzarist Russia was economically backward relative to its European rivals.  It could not project force in sufficient numbers to defeat Germany, and made strategic mistakes in pursuing its offensive strategy.  Despite the fact that two-thirds of the German Army was concentrated on the Western Front, Tzarist Russia was not able to field a sufficient army to defeat the Germans, and this likely lead to the collapse in support for the Russian Government in the Army and in the masses. 

There is a standard American explanation of the rise of Communism in Russia, and the subsequent rise of National Socialism, which is the psychological seduction theory.  Specifically, Communist ideology and Nazi ideology beguiled the general populace with the false promise of totalitarianism, and people irrationally gave into small-minded hatred and intolerance.

I would like to suggest an alternative viewpoint, starting specifically with why Communism found favor with the Russian Army and the Russian people.  The Russians understood that Russia was economically backwards, and the traditional system, involving the Tzar and the nobility, was incapable of reforming itself and incapable of projecting a modern army capable of protecting Russia from the threat of Germany.

Although Germany lost the First World War, it probably only lost it because of the late entry of America (preventing German hegemony in Europe).  The Treaty of Versailles, perhaps correctly, undermined the German economy and restricted the German capacity to rearm itself, but it is clear that the Russian people sensed the existential threat posed by Germany, and the elite undoubtedly understood that Germany would be back.

Although the Communists faced civil war, and spent enormous time and energy in unifying Russia, once Communist control was consolidated, Stalin began a ruthless campaign of industrialization and militarization.  Starting from Russia possessing 11% of European GNP in 1913, the Russian economy under Communist leadership grew to 28% of European GNP by 1940.  Between 1933 to 1938, the size of the Red Army tripled.  The following table, based on Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics illustrates the massive increase in military capacity under Stalin:

Date            Artillery       Tanks          Men** % of European GNP   (vs. Germany)

1930                952             170          .535             14%                      33%
1933             4,368          3,509         
1936             4,324          4,800          1.30
1940           15,300         2,794*         3.60             28%                      36%

*Soviet conversion to Heavy Tanks
** Millions  (by 1941, Soviets had 5.0 million in Army with 2.9 million fighting)

What Communism offered Russia, which neither liberal democracy nor traditional monarchy could offer, was a system of centralized, consolidated power which allowed for the rapid creation of a massive war machine.  Unlike France and the Western front, which collapsed in a matter of months under the Blitzkrieg, Russia proved itself capable of holding its ground alone against the massive onslaught of the entire German Army at the peak of Nazi power.  If Russia had not adopted Communism, it is unlikely that under a rival system it would have been capable of industrializing and militarizing in the short space of time it had, and it is entirely possible that Nazi Germany would have won its goal of European hegemony.  The same cannot be said for the French Third Republic.

We can also understand the sentiments of the post-WWI German elite, who knew in their hearts of hearts that the goal of European hegemony has slipped through their fingers at the last moment due to the intervention of America.  The Treaty of Versailles represented a speed bump on the road to hegemony, and it was inevitable, given Germany’s population and level of relative industrialization, that it would make a second attempt.  The main rift in the Weimer Republic, between the Nazi’s and the German Socialist Worker’s Party, was really a question of whether to embrace the model being set by the Soviet Union, or to pursue a more limited model of state control, corporatism.   However, in both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, socialism/state capitalism was linked to the creation of a war machine capable of achieving, or resisting, German hegemony. 

Although I am not attempting to suggest that totalitarianism is the answer to contemporary American problems, I am suggesting that in times of war, or in a country facing probable total war, the need for centralizing state decision-making into a unitary executive officer is necessary for national survival.  In addition, I am suggesting that state control and state management of private industry is fruitful for the rapid industrialization (and militarization) of an economy.  These methods of state ownership were not necessary in England and America during the Second World War, precisely because both England and America were heavily industrialized at the time of the conflict, and therefore, the transition to a modern war economy required less relative effort.   

Rather than viewing the adoption of Communism by Russia, or National Socialism by Germany as “irrational”, these ideologies served as the intellectual templates for “getting the job done.”  It is noteworthy that high ranking German military officials such as Colonel von Tresckow began plotting assassination attempts against Hitler in 1942, when it was clear that Stalin had held off the Germans, that the Americans were joining the war, and that the bid for German hegemony had failed.     

I have discussed the existential threat posed to Russia by Germany, and perhaps, one can understand why a perfectly rational Russian officer might throw in their lot with Lenin, despite deep reservations, in an effort to preserve the national sovereignty of Russia, but one might ask, why did the German elite desire to stage a repeat of World War I?  (Ignoring the fact that they would have likely won the war without the last minute entry of America.) 

To answer this, we have to understand the ambivalence of all acts of aggression:  an act undertaken as a defensive move is always interpreted as an offensive move by one’s enemy.  Germany, defeated and humiliated, had its economy destroyed by its foreign enemies, and its hands tied behind its back while it watched Stalin transform the Soviet Union into the hegemonic war machine it became--in  the post-war era--controlling the entire Eastern Block, and checked only by American boots on the ground and an American nuclear arsenal.  If Germany had waited, or pursued a less effective means of mobilization, then Germany would have been forced to defend against a Soviet bid for hegemony. 

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