As I have discussed previously,
the First World War was predicated on the rise of German power, both in terms
of industrial capacity and wealth (constituting 40% of Europe as a whole in
1913) as well as population. Germany,
due to its strategic position of strength, made a bid for regional hegemony in
Europe, culminating in the First World War.
I believe the strategic threat posed by Germany was critical to the Fall
of the Tzar and the rise of Communism in Russia.
Industrially, Tzarist Russia was economically
backward relative to its European rivals.
It could not project force in sufficient numbers to defeat Germany, and
made strategic mistakes in pursuing its offensive strategy. Despite the fact that two-thirds of the
German Army was concentrated on the Western Front, Tzarist Russia was not able
to field a sufficient army to defeat the Germans, and this likely lead to the collapse
in support for the Russian Government in the Army and in the masses.
There is a standard American
explanation of the rise of Communism in Russia, and the subsequent rise of National
Socialism, which is the psychological seduction theory. Specifically, Communist ideology and Nazi
ideology beguiled the general populace with the false promise of
totalitarianism, and people irrationally gave into small-minded hatred and intolerance.
I would like to suggest an
alternative viewpoint, starting specifically with why Communism found favor
with the Russian Army and the Russian people.
The Russians understood that Russia was economically backwards, and the
traditional system, involving the Tzar and the nobility, was incapable of
reforming itself and incapable of projecting a modern army capable of
protecting Russia from the threat of Germany.
Although Germany lost the First
World War, it probably only lost it because of the late entry of America
(preventing German hegemony in Europe).
The Treaty of Versailles, perhaps correctly, undermined the German
economy and restricted the German capacity to rearm itself, but it is clear
that the Russian people sensed the existential threat posed by Germany, and the
elite undoubtedly understood that Germany would be back.
Although the Communists faced
civil war, and spent enormous time and energy in unifying Russia, once
Communist control was consolidated, Stalin began a ruthless campaign of
industrialization and militarization. Starting from Russia possessing 11% of European
GNP in 1913, the Russian economy under Communist leadership grew to 28% of
European GNP by 1940. Between 1933 to
1938, the size of the Red Army tripled.
The following table, based on Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
illustrates the massive increase in military capacity under Stalin:
Date Artillery Tanks Men** % of European GNP (vs. Germany)
1930 952
170 .535 14% 33%
1933 4,368
3,509
1936 4,324
4,800 1.30
1940 15,300 2,794* 3.60 28% 36%
*Soviet conversion to Heavy Tanks
** Millions (by 1941, Soviets had 5.0 million in Army
with 2.9 million fighting)
What Communism offered Russia,
which neither liberal democracy nor traditional monarchy could offer, was a
system of centralized, consolidated power which allowed for the rapid creation
of a massive war machine. Unlike France
and the Western front, which collapsed in a matter of months under the Blitzkrieg,
Russia proved itself capable of holding its ground alone against the massive
onslaught of the entire German Army at the peak of Nazi power. If Russia had not adopted Communism, it is
unlikely that under a rival system it would have been capable of
industrializing and militarizing in the short space of time it had, and it is
entirely possible that Nazi Germany would have won its goal of European
hegemony. The same cannot be said for the French Third Republic.
We can also understand the
sentiments of the post-WWI German elite, who knew in their hearts of hearts
that the goal of European hegemony has slipped through their fingers at the
last moment due to the intervention of America.
The Treaty of Versailles represented a speed bump on the road to
hegemony, and it was inevitable, given Germany’s population and level of
relative industrialization, that it would make a second attempt. The main rift in the Weimer Republic, between
the Nazi’s and the German Socialist Worker’s Party, was really a question of
whether to embrace the model being set by the Soviet Union, or to pursue a more
limited model of state control, corporatism.
However, in both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, socialism/state
capitalism was linked to the creation of a war machine capable of achieving, or
resisting, German hegemony.
Although I am not attempting to
suggest that totalitarianism is the answer to contemporary American problems, I
am suggesting that in times of war, or in a country facing probable total war,
the need for centralizing state decision-making into a unitary executive officer
is necessary for national survival. In
addition, I am suggesting that state control and state management of private industry
is fruitful for the rapid industrialization (and militarization) of an
economy. These methods of state
ownership were not necessary in England and America during the Second World
War, precisely because both England and America were heavily industrialized at
the time of the conflict, and therefore, the transition to a modern war economy
required less relative effort.
Rather than viewing the adoption
of Communism by Russia, or National Socialism by Germany as “irrational”, these
ideologies served as the intellectual templates for “getting the job done.” It is noteworthy that high ranking German
military officials such as Colonel von Tresckow began plotting assassination
attempts against Hitler in 1942, when it was clear that Stalin had held off the
Germans, that the Americans were joining the war, and that the bid for German
hegemony had failed.
I have discussed the existential
threat posed to Russia by Germany, and perhaps, one can understand why a
perfectly rational Russian officer might throw in their lot with Lenin, despite
deep reservations, in an effort to preserve the national sovereignty of Russia,
but one might ask, why did the German elite desire to stage a repeat of World
War I? (Ignoring the fact that they
would have likely won the war without the last minute entry of America.)
To answer this, we have to
understand the ambivalence of all acts of aggression: an act undertaken as a defensive move is
always interpreted as an offensive move by one’s enemy. Germany, defeated and humiliated, had its
economy destroyed by its foreign enemies, and its hands tied behind its back
while it watched Stalin transform the Soviet Union into the hegemonic war
machine it became--in the post-war era--controlling the entire Eastern Block, and
checked only by American boots on the ground and an American nuclear arsenal. If Germany had waited, or pursued a less
effective means of mobilization, then Germany would have been forced to defend against a
Soviet bid for hegemony.
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